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Abstract
A comparison of the point forecasts and the central tendencies of probability distributions
of ination and output growth of the SPF indicates that the point forecasts are sometimes
optimistic relative to the probability distributions. We consider and evaluate a number of
possible explanations for this 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Explanations of the inconsistencies
in survey respondentsforecasts
A comparison of the point forecasts and the central tendencies of probability distributions of
ination and output growth of the SPF indicates that the point forecasts are sometimes optimistic
relative to the probability distributions. We consider and evaluate a number of possible explanations
for this nding, including the degree of uncertainty concerning the future, computational costs,
delayed updating, and asymmetric loss. We also consider the relative accuracy of the two sets of
forecasts.
Journal of Economic Literature classication: C53, E32, E37
Keywords: Rationality, point forecasts, probability distributions.
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1 Introduction
There is a now a large literature addressing various aspects of the rationality of point forecasts of key
macro aggregates, such as output and ination (see Stekler (2002) for a recent review), and smaller
but expanding literatures on the evaluation of probability distributions (e.g., Diebold, Gunther
and Tay (1998), Diebold, Hahn and Tay (1999a)), interval and quantile forecasts (e.g., Granger,
White and Kamstra (1989), Christo¤ersen (1998) and Giacomini and Komunjer (2005)), volatility
forecasts (e.g., Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Labys (2003)),
and probability forecasts (e.g., Clements and Harvey (2006)). Recently, a number of authors have
sought to assess forecaster rationality in terms of the internal consistency of the di¤erent types of
forecasts simultaneously made by individual forecasters. The key papers are Engelberg, Manski
and Williams (2007), who compare the point forecasts and histograms of the respondents to the US
Survey of Professional Forecasters, and Clements (2008), who in addition assesses the evidence for
consistency of the SPF respondentshistograms and forecast probabilities of declines in real output
growth. Inconsistencies are found, and are generally in the direction of the point and probability
forecasts indicating a rosier outlook than the histograms: the point forecasts of output growth
and ination are higher and lower, respectively, than implied by the histogram forecasts,1 and the
histogram probabilities of declines in output tend to overstate the directly-reported probabilities
that respondents assign to such an event.
The aim of this paper is to explore a number of potential explanations of the tendency of
some forecasters to produce forecasts which are more optimistic than measures of central tendency
derived from their histograms. We consider the possibility that the apparent inconsistencies may
result from the di¢ culties inherent in deriving measures of central tendency from the reported
histograms, as well as from lack of knowledge of what it is that the point forecasts are. We also
allow the possibility that the two sets of forecasters are consistent once we allow the forecasters to
have more general loss functions. We can make our analysis reasonably robust to some of these
aspects, as well as testing whether others (e.g., more general loss functions) are fully coherent with
the data. We also consider explanations which would suggest that the professional forecasters have
di¢ culty undertaking the (relatively simple) calculations that are required to produce consistent
forecasts, as well as an argument that there are signicant costs that prohibit even professional
forecasters from updating their histogram forecasts in a timely fashion.
To date the inconsistencies have been documented in the cited papers, but remain largely
unexplained. Engelberg et al. (2007) consider whether the tendency of survey respondents to
1García and Manzanares (2007) report a similar tendency for the GDP growth and ination forecasts of the ECBs
Survey of Professional Forecasters, for the period 1999Q1 to 2006Q4.
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round the probabilities of their histogram forecasts might be responsible, but nd that their results
are qualitatively unchanged if they allow for rounding. Clements (2008) considers the possibility
that respondents point forecast loss functions are asymmetric (whilst the reported histograms
accurately reect the individuals true beliefs). Then, the forecaster may rationally report as a
point forecast a quantile of their probability distribution other than the central tendency (see, e.g.,
Elliott, Komunjer and Timmermann (2005a) and Patton and Timmermann (2007)). As individuals
may have loss functions with di¤erent degrees of asymmetry, Clements (2008) tests for rationality
allowing for asymmetric loss separately for each individual, based on whether the di¤erence between
the histogram mean and point forecasts varies systematically with variables in the information set
(other than the conditional variance or standard deviation). We will revisit this issue using panel
regressions, as we nd that forecast uncertainty appears to play an important role, as would be
predicted by the asymmetric loss explanation: forecast uncertainty will drive a wedge between the
optimal point forecast and the conditional mean. However, there are other explanations that suggest
a role for uncertainty, and these will also be explored, as well as a wider range of possibilities. As
suggested above, these include explanations motivated by the literature on bounded rationality and
learning (see, e.g., Evans and Honkapohja (2001), Mankiw and Reis (2002), and Carroll (2003)),
and we use panel regressions to assess the evidence that the two types of forecast di¤er in terms of
the rate at which they are updated.
A set of possible issues that we do not address is that forecasters may face economic incentives
to act strategically in the sense of balancing accuracy against conicting aims, such as convincing
the market that they are well-informed, or of attracting media attention (see, e.g., Ehrbeck and
Waldmann (1996), Laster, Bennett and Geoum (1999) and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006)). It is
possible that these factors may impinge di¤erently on the point forecasts and histograms. Whilst
the anonymity of the SPF respondents might be expected to rule out some of these strategic motives,
one might also argue that the respondents are likely to report the same forecasts to the SPF as
they make public, so that these issues remain pertinent.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briey describes the SPF survey, and section 3
records the evidence for inconsistencies between the point forecasts and measures of central tendency
of the histograms for ination and output growth, and how these inconsistencies are distributed
over respondent and time. Section 4 considers the possibility that respondents with more highly-
peaked underlying distributions are less likely to produce inconsistent forecasts than respondents
with relatively atter densities. This is borne out by the data, although in section 5 we attempt
to disentangle this e¤ect - the shape of the distribution - from the possibility that the greater
computational complexity from assigning probability mass to more bins results in inconsistencies.
Section 6 considers the possibility that forecasters react di¤erently to the arrival of new information
4
when they update point and histogram forecasts, and that the e¢ ciency of the two types of fore-
casts may di¤er. Section 7 presents panel regressions that investigate possible determinants of the
di¤erence between the point forecast and the histogram, motivated by asymmetric loss, although
the results are amenable to alternative interpretations, as indicated by the discussion in sections 4
and 5. Section 8 compares the point forecasts and histogram means in terms of forecast accuracy,
and indicates that rather than speaking of a tendency of the point forecasts to optimism we ought
instead to label the histograms as tending to be too pessimistic, at least in terms of rst moments.
Section 9 concludes.
2 The Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF)
The SPF is a quarterly survey of professional macroeconomic forecasters that elicits information
on the outlook for the US economy. The respondents provide point forecasts for a number of macro
variables, as well as reporting histograms for output growth and ination: see Croushore (1993)
for details. The survey began in the fourth quarter of 1968.
We use data from 1968:4 to 2006:4 for ination, and from 1981:3 onwards for output growth, as
prior to 1981:3 the histograms for output growth referred to nominal output, and point forecasts
for real GDP (GNP) were not recorded. For these surveys, we have individual respondentspoint
forecasts for the levels of output and the GNP/GDP deator in the current year, as well as for the
previous quarter, for the current quarter, and the next four quarters. We construct forecasts of
the annual growth rates as follows. The current year annual value is constructed by summing the
forecasts of the quarters and actual values as appropriate, and then dividing by the previous years
value. The actual values are taken from the Real Time Data Set for Macroeconomists (RTDSM)
maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (see Croushore and Stark (2001)). The
RTDSMs contain the values of output that would have been available at the time the forecast was
made, as subsequent revisions, base-year and other denitional changes that occurred after the
reference date are omitted. Thus, for a forecast made in 2001:Q1, the 2000 value of output would
be taken from the 2001:Q1 RTDSM, and the forecast for 2001 would be calculated by summing the
forecast of the current quarter (2001:Q1) and the forecasts of the next three quarters (2001:Q2 to
2001:Q4). For a forecast made in 2001:Q4, the value in 2000 is taken from the 2001:Q4 RTDSM,
and the current year forecast consists of the current quarter forecast of 2001:Q4 and the actual
values of the rst three quarters of the year taken from the same RTDSM. As of the 1981:3 survey,
respondents annual forecasts of the current year were also recorded. For both variables from the
1981:3 survey onwards the actual annual level of the variable in the previous year is provided to
the survey respondents.
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3 Consistency of the point forecasts and histograms
Establishing whether the point forecasts and probability distributions are consistent is complicated
by it being unclear whether the point forecasts should be interpreted as the means, modes or even
medians of the probability distributions. Engelberg et al. (2007) calculate non-parametric bounds
for the three measures of central tendency from the histograms, and obtain similar results, in the
sense that roughly similar proportions of the pairs of point forecasts and histograms are found to be
inconsistent whether we assume that the point forecasts are the means, the medians, or the modes
of the underlying subjective distributions. Our analysis of consistency using bounds replicates
that of Engelberg et al. (2007), but extends the sample. Engelberg et al. (2007) restrict their start
period to 1992:1, in part because it is not clear whether prior to this period respondents were always
provided with the previous years level of output / deator. There is therefore uncertainty over the
previous years value of output that the forecaster had in mind when reporting their current year
forecast level. We use all the available surveys and construct the previous yearslevels of output
and the deator using the RTDSMs.
The bounds approach allows us calculate the lower and upper values (the bounds) of each
of the three measures of central tendency that are consistent with a histogram when we do not
wish to make any assumption about the distribution of probability mass within the histogram
bins. We obtain an upper and lower bound on the measure of central tendency, rather than a
point estimate, and the point forecast can then be compared to the bounds to see whether it is
consistent with the interpretation that it is the mean, median or mode (or any number of these
three) of the underlying distribution reported in the form of the histogram. For the mean, the lower
(upper) bound is calculated by assuming that all the probability lies at the lower (upper) limit of
the histogram bin. For the median, the bounds are given by the interval which contains 50% of the
cumulative probability, and the mode is given by the interval with the maximum probability.2
Point estimates of moments can be calculated from histograms by assuming that the probability
mass is uniform within a bin (e.g., Diebold, Tay and Wallis (1999b) make this assumption in the
context of calculating probability integral transforms), as well as by tting parametric distributions
such as the normal (e.g., Giordani and Söderlind (2003, p. 1044)) or the unimodal generalized beta
distribution (Engelberg et al. (2007)).
Table 1 reports the percentages of point forecasts which are within, below and above the bounds
calculated on the mean, median and mode. The results aggregate over all respondents and all time
2See Engelberg et al. (2007) for details. We simplify by considering only histograms with two or more contiguous
bins with non-zero probabilities. When two adjacent bins share the maximum probability, the bounds on the mode
double to take in both intervals.
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periods, although they are presented separately for each quarter to control for di¤erences that might
arise because of the length of the forecast horizon. The results are broadly similar, in that similar
proportions of point forecasts are found to be favourable for each measure of central tendency. We
conclude that respondents point forecasts are more optimistic than their histograms to similar
degrees for both these variables. The degree of inconsistency diminishes as the horizon shortens
(going from the Q1 to Q4 surveys) but the tendency toward optimism persists.
A problem with this is that there is no reason to assume that all the respondents report the
same measure, or even that an individual reports the same measure through time. As we do not
know what it is that is being reported, we report evidence of inconsistency which is loaded in favour
of nding that the point forecasts and histograms are consistent. For each pair of point forecast and
histogram, we require only that the point forecast lies within the bounds on any one of the three
measures of central tendency in order for the two types of forecast to be ruled mutually consistent.
A forecast is ruled favourable only if it exceeds the upper bounds on each of the three measures (in
the case of output growth), and is unfavourable if it lies below the lowest of the three lower bounds.
Even in this most conservative case we nd that approximately 85% of the ination forecasts made
in the rst quarter surveys are inconsistent, and the favourable ination point forecasts outnumber
the unfavourable approximately two to one. A similar tendency to optimism is also still apparent
for output growth in this conservative scenario.
In the following, we will dene inconsistent forecasts as those for which the point forecast is
outside the bounds on the mean. To better understand the distribution of inconsistencies, we
disaggregate our ndings in two dimensions. We consider whether a relatively small number of
respondents are responsible for the inconsistencies, and whether the inconsistencies primarily arise
from a small number of time periods. Figures 1 and 2 present histograms of the distribution
of respondents by the percentage of their forecasts which are above or below the bounds. For
both ination and output it is apparent that the vast majority of respondents fall in the rst
few cells, indicating that the inconsistencies we observe are not attributable to a small number of
errant respondents who habitually report inconsistent forecasts. Figure 3 indicates that for output
growth point forecasts may have been more optimistic in the 90s than in the prior decade, whereas
for ination (gure 4) there are no clear patterns.
4 Shape of underlying probability distributions
A possible explanation of the inconsistencies between the histograms and point forecasts is the
following. It seems reasonable to suppose that respondents with highly-peaked probability density
functions are less likely to produce inconsistent forecasts (in the sense of point forecasts outside of
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histogram mean bounds) than respondents with atter densities. When the respondent assigns a
large probability to the outcome falling in a relatively narrowly dened range one might suppose
that the point forecast and histogram are more likely to be mutually-consistent way.3 A testable
implication would be that inconsistent forecasts should be associated with more dispersed proba-
bility distributions. We calculate measures of dispersion for all the reported histograms, and report
averages of those measures conditional on whether the histograms correspond to the point forecast
lying within the bounds on the histogram mean, below the bounds, or above the bounds. The
measures of dispersion are the variance and the inter-quartile range (IQ).4 We take as the averages
of these measures the median, to lessen dependence on a small number of extreme values.5 Table
2 bears out our hypothesis: the median variances and IQs for the optimistic output and ination
forecasts (labelled aboveand below, respectively) are markedly higher than the within. How-
ever, at least for ination the pessimistic forecasts are similar to the consistent forecasts in terms
of the degree of uncertainty, whilst for output the pessimistic forecasts are generally characterised
by more uncertainty. So for output growth greater uncertainty is associated with more optimistic
point forecasts, but for ination greater uncertainty is associated with bound violations in either
direction.
It is worth remarking that the bounds approach is required because of the groupingor dis-
cretizationof the histogram, and the size of the bound is given by the bin width, and does not
depend on the degree of uncertainty given by the spread of the histogram.
5 Computational complexity
Table 3 reports the number of violations of the bounds according to the number of bins to which
the respondent attached positive probabilities. As the maximum number of permitted bins has
changed over the period, we report results separately for two sub-periods for output growth, and
for three sub-periods for ination (see notes to table). Except for the rst sub-period for output,
it is apparent that the proportion of optimistic point forecasts increases with the number of bins
used by the respondent. Note that the majority tend to use only a relatively small number of bins.
3So, for example, one would expect the two to be more likely to be consistent in the extreme case of all the
probability mass being assigned to a single interval, compared to when positive probability is attached to all the bins.
4The variance is calculated assuming the probability mass lies at the mid-point of each bin, and applying Sheppards
correction, and the IQ is calculated from linear interpolation (assuming the probability mass is uniform within a bin).
5The results reported in the table are based on histograms for which there are two or more bins with non-zero
probability, and for which the non-zero bins are contiguous, but neither of these assumptions is crucial. The results are
qualitatively unchanged if, for example, we require at least three non-zero bins and allow multi-modal distributions.
Requiring at least three non-zero bins has the greatest e¤ect on the shorter horizon forecasts - about a half of the Q4
survey histograms make use of only two bins, reecting less uncertainty one-step ahead.
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For example, aggregating over the sub-periods, for both variables around 60% of the total number
of histograms have positive probabilities attached to only 2 or 3 bins. The table also shows that
forecasts using low numbers of bins tend to be those made in the third and fourth quarters of the
year, as expected, because there is less uncertainty surrounding the shorter horizon forecasts.
Because the number of non-zero bins (henceforth, b) is positively correlated with forecast un-
certainty, the correlation between b and the number of bounds violations may simply reect the
dependence of bounds violations on the shape of the underlying probability distribution, as dis-
cussed in section 4. Alternatively, the correlation between violations and uncertainty evident in
table 2 may itself be attributable to the greater computational demands of producing mutually
consistent histograms and point forecasts for larger b.
Can we disentangle the computational costsand distribution shapeexplanations of bounds
violations? To check whether there is a correlation between inconsistency and uncertainty holding
computational complexity (b) xed, for b equal to one of f2; 3; 4g we calculate the median variance
and IQ of the histograms separately depending on whether the point forecast is within the bounds,
below the bounds, or above the bounds. Table 4 records the results for small values of b, namely
b = 2; 3; 4.6 Apart from the rst subsample for ination, for the other periods for both variables the
median histogram variance is higher for the more optimistic forecasts (belowfor ination, above
for output growth) for b = 3 and b = 4. So controlling for computational complexity we still nd a
positive correlation between bounds violations and forecast uncertainty.
An alternative approach is to try and exploit the changes in the degree of discretization of the
histogram that occurred over the period for both output and ination, as documented in the notes
to table 3. Essentially, the bin widths were 2 percentage points between 1981:3 and 1991:4, but
only 1 percentage point subsequently (1992:1 to 2006:4), and in the earlier period in the case on
the ination forecasts (1968:4 to 1981:2). If the degree of computational complexity is assumed
to depend solely on the number of bins assigned non-zero probabilities, and given on average that
uncertainty will be higher for a given b for a coarser discretization, we can infer the following
directly from table 3. For output, comparing the two periods for either b = 2 or 3, it is evident
that the optimistic proportion is similar, and for b = 4 or 5 optimism is greater in the second
period. Qualitatively the same results hold for ination. This would suggest that the shape of the
underlying probability distributions is not the explanation: computational complexity is key. For a
given degree of complexity (given by b) the tendency towards optimism does not increase with the
ner discretization (going from 1981:3 - 1991:4 to 1992:1 - 2006:4). The main problem with this is
the assumption that the degree of complexity does not depend on the degree of discretization for a
6As is evident from table 3, for values of b in excess of 4 the number of respondents tails o¤.
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given b.
The evidence presented in this section points in both directions, which is perhaps not unsur-
prising given the di¢ culty of unravelling the two closely related e¤ects. Both explanations share
the drawback of not being able of explain the tendency of the point forecasts to relative optimism
(as opposed to the two sets of forecasts simply being inconsistent).
6 Delayed updating
A possible explanation for the inconsistency of the point forecasts and histograms is that forecasters
react di¤erently to the arrival of new information when they come to update point and histogram
forecasts. One possibility is that the costs of information acquisition and processing di¤er for the two
types of forecasts.7 One might suppose that a histogram is more costly too produce, and that agents
may not revise their histograms as frequently as their point forecasts. Optimistic point forecasts
would then arise if over the period under study the shocks to the economy were predominantly
favourable, in terms of output growth and ination being higher and lower, respectively, than
anticipated. We investigate the possibility that point forecasts and histogram means are revised
di¤erently when new information arises.8
As well as assessing how the two sets of forecasts are revised in response to new information,
we also consider whether an e¢ cient use is made of past information. If so, then revisions to xed-
eventforecasts should not be systematically related to any information available at the time the
initial forecast was made (see, e.g., Nordhaus (1987), Clements (1995)). We allow for information
sets comprising macro-economic variables known at the time the initial forecast was made.
We analyse these two issues using panels of individual forecasters. The panels are unbalanced
because few respondents are ever-present given the duration of the surveys (1968 onwards for
ination; 1981 onwards for real output). We include all individuals who reported full sets of point
forecasts and histograms for ve or more years. We estimate the following two regressions for both
point forecasts and histogram means:
xit;q = 1;qxit;q 1 + 2;qxt;q + uit;q (1)
7That latest information may not be incorporated in expectatations is an implication of the sticky-information
model: Mankiw and Reis (2002), Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2003) and Carroll (2003). However, one might argue
that such a model is unlikely to apply to professional forecasters - Carroll (2003) takes the view that professional
forecasts embody the latest news.
8This may also arise within a Bayesian learning setting, whereby individual i updates their prior forecaster (say,
their rst forecast of yt, made at t   p; yi;tjt p) as new information accrues to produce a posterior forecasts (say,
yi;tjt p+1). Kandel and Pearson (1995) and Kandel and Zilberfarb (1999) consider the possibility that individuals
interprete the new information di¤erently, and these ideas are applied by Lahiri and Sheng (2007).
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and:
xit;q   xit;q 1 = qZt;q 1 + u0it;q (2)
where t 2 [1982; 1983; : : : ; 2006] for output growth and t 2 [1969; 1983; : : : ; 2006] for ination, q
indexes the survey quarter, and i the respondent. Hence when q = 2, xit;q denotes a forecast of the
annual rate of output or ination made in the second quarter of that year, and Zt;q 1 in (2) contains
macro-variables known at the time of the rst-quarter survey of year t (or the fourth quarter of the
previous year when q = 1).
We estimate (1) and (2) separately for q = 2; 3; 4. This allows for the possibility that the rate
at which newsis incorporated may depend on the forecast horizon, in the case of (1), and that
the e¢ ciency of the forecasts may depend on the horizon, in the case of (2).
Consider rst (1). xt;q is the consensusor average forecast over all those who responded to the
quarter q survey in year t. The consensus forecast is assumed to incorporate all the latest available
information or news. We are assuming the consensus forecast is known when the individual makes
their forecast. Literally, this requires that an individual knows the forecast being made by all other
respondents. This may not be too unreasonable - as professional forecasters, the SPF respondents
are likely to contribute forecasts to analysts reports (etc.) on a regular basis, which are likely to be
read by their fellow forecasters. Alternatively, the consensus view can be assumed to be a proxy
for a forecast informed by the latest information on monthly indicators, federal announcements,
etc. Of interest in (1) is the value of 2, and whether this di¤ers between the point forecasts and
histogram means.9
In (2),  = 0 implies that revisions are not correlated with information in the agentsinformation
sets. The macro-variables we include are the unemployment rate and the 3-month Treasury bill
rate, as well as output growth and the rate of ination (GNP/GDP deator), all taken from the
RTDSMs. We construct series consisting of the latest available value at each point in time (so, for
example, Zt;q 1 is the value of the macro-variable in the RTDSM available in quarter q  1 of year
t: this will be the rst-release value for quarter q   2).10
Tables 5 and 6 report the results of estimating (1) and (2). Both are estimated using the xed
e¤ects estimator (FE) and the random e¤ects GLS estimator (RE-GLS).11 Note that for (2) there
9Note that Carroll (2003) derives a model of stickyaggregate expectations due to some individuals only occa-
sionally paying attention to the latest news bulletins and reports, and tests the null that H0: 2 = 1. At the level of
the individual, our interest is in whether the population value of  di¤ers between the two sets of forecasts.
10Output growth and ination are constructed as quarterly changes. The Treasury bill and unemployment rate are
entered as levels.
Note that the 1996:1 vintage value of output and the deator for 1995:4 is missing. In the test regressions this is
replaced by the 1996:1 vintage value of 1995:3 (relative to 1995:2).
11Both models are estimated in STATA using panel robustestimation of the covariance matrix of the estimated
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are no individual-specic explanatory variables, and the use of pooled OLS (with an appropriate
estimator of the coe¢ cient covariance matrix) gave very similar results to those reported in the
table.12 In each case we include all four macro-variables and record the p-value of a test of joint
insignicance.
The estimates in table 5 indicate a smaller weight on the consensus forecast at the long horizon
(the Q2 forecasts) for the histogram means compared to the point forecasts - the longer-horizon
histogram mean forecasts do not incorporate the latest information to the same extent as the point
forecasts. This is true of the regressions for output growth and ination, and does not depend
on the panel data model we adopt - it holds for both the FE estimator and RE-GLS. The results
at the shorter horizons are more mixed - e.g., the estimated value of 2 for the output growth
histogram means exceeds that for the point forecasts for the Q4 surveys - but the longer horizon
forecasts are of more interest because it is at the longer horizons that more bounds violations occur.
(Unfortunately we are unable to run a regression such as (1) for the Q1 survey forecasts).
Next, the results in table 6 indicate that generally the revision to the point forecasts and
histogram means are systematically related to macro-variables known at the time the initial forecast
was made. There are exceptions: the long-horizon point forecasts of output growth appear to be
e¢ cient, as do the Q3 histogram mean output growth forecasts. The results reported in table 6 on
the e¢ ciency of the revisions to the forecasts do not suggest clear di¤erences by type of forecast
that might explain the inconsistencies between the two types of forecasts. Although the results on
delayed updating point to some di¤erences at the longer horizon, we are left to conclude that the
regressions in this section, which consider the properties of the two types of forecasts separately,
shed little light on the reasons for the inconsistencies documented in table 1. We are also assuming
that the point estimates of histogram means (rather than the bounds) adequately reect the means
of the subjective distributions reported as histograms. In the next section we pair the two types of
forecast by individual to address the question of interest in a more direct fashion.
7 Asymmetric loss functions
In this section we pair the two types of forecasts (histogram mean and point forecast) by individual
and report panel regressions of whether the discrepancy between the two is systematically related to
a number of explanatory variables. The approach we adopt is motivated by the recent literature on
parameters. If we write the composite error in (1) (and similary for (2)) as uit;q = i;q + vit;q, then RE-GLS requires
that the fvit;qg are serially independent. Because we run separate regressions for each forecast horizon (i.e., for the
rst-quarter surveys, the second quarter, etc) this may be a reasonable assumption.
12Note that OLS is a consistent estimator of the RE model even if autocorrelation in fvit;qg induces correlation in
the composite errors fuit;qg, but is inconsistent for the FE model in these circumstances.
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testing for rationality allowing for asymmetric loss, and the recognition that systematic di¤erences
between histogram means and point forecasts may be consistent with optimal forecasting under
asymmetric loss. However, the empirical results in this section can simply be interpreted in terms
of whether the di¤erences between point forecasts and histograms vary systematically with known
factors without invoking the assumption of asymmetric point-forecast loss functions, and we have
already discussed in sections 4 and 5 other reasons which would indicate a dependence between
these di¤erences and forecast uncertainty.
For the asymmetric loss explanation we need to assume that the histograms accurately reect
the individualstrue (subjective) beliefs, in the sense that the histograms are not an intentionally
biasedrepresentation of the individualsprobability assessments. By way of contrast, individuals
report point forecasts that are optimal for asymmetric loss functions, in the sense that greater costs
are attached to (say) under-predictions compared to over-predictions.13 Clements (2008) considers
whether asymmetric loss can explain the tendency to report relatively optimistic output growth
forecasts. He estimates separate regressions for each individual (who made a minimum number of
returns), whereas we will pool over individuals, and consider both the output growth and ination
forecasts. We will also contrast the results we obtain using the estimated histogram means with
a panel-logit approach that only requires the calculation of the non-parametric bounds on the
histogram mean.
Using the results in Patton and Timmermann (2007), we can show that, under relatively weak
restrictions on the form of the loss function and the data generating process, the optimal forecast
is given by:
ft+h;t = Et (yt+h) + h 
p
Vt (yt+h)
where Et (yt+h)  E (yt+h j 
t), Vt (yt+h)  V ar (yt+h j 
t), with the data generating process
yt+h j 
t  D (Et [yt+h] ; Vt [yt+h]) for some constant distribution function D, and where h is a
constant that depends only on the form of D and the forecast loss function. ft+h;t is the directly
reported point forecast. h < 0 when over-predictions (et+h;t < 0) are penalised more heavily
than under-predictions, and vice versa. The deviation between the optimal point forecast and the
conditional mean depends on the conditional standard deviation. Intuitively, the more costly over-
predictions relative to under-predictions, say, and the more likely both over- and under-predictions
(because the more uncertain the outlook), then the more the forecaster will aim to under-predict on
average. Under the assumptions we have made, the bias of a rational forecaster should depend on
13The literature on the properties of optimal forecasts under asymmetric loss includes, inter alia, Granger (1969),
Zellner (1986), Christo¤ersen and Diebold (1997), Elliott and Timmermann (2004, p. 48), Elliott et al. (2005a),
Elliott, Komunjer and Timmermann (2005b) and Patton and Timmermann (2007), and is used to motivate this
section.
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the forecast standard deviation but should not be systematically related to other variables known
at time t:
E (yt+h   ft+h;t j 
t) = E

yt+h  

Et (yt+h) + h 
p
Vt (yt+h)

j 
t

=  h 
p
Vt (yt+h)
This motivates the suggestion of Pesaran and Weale (2006) to test for rational expectations with
asymmetric losses by running a regression such as:
et+h;t  yt+h   ft+h;t = e1pVt (yt+h) + e02Zt +et+h (3)
where under the null we would expect to nd e2 = 0, but e1 6= 0 if loss is asymmetric. Alternatively,
the same implications hold for a regression in which the dependent variable is not the forecast error
but the di¤erence between the histogram mean and the point forecast, say
Et (yt+h)  ft+h;t = 1
p
Vt (yt+h) + 
0
2Zt + t+h (4)
In general, (4) might be preferred to (3) for the following reason. Suppose yt+h and Et (yt+h) di¤er
by a random term, t+h = yt+h Et (yt+h). In this interpretation, t+h is a measurement error, such
that the dependent variable in (3) is a noisy proxy for the dependent variable Et (Yt+h)   ft+h;t
in (4). Standard analysis suggests that even if E
 
t+h j 
t

= 0, so that t+h is uncorrelated
with any variables that might be included as explanatory variables, then inference based on (3)
will be less precise than tests based on (4). But when in addition E
 
t+h;Xt
 6= 0, where Xt =hp
Vt (yt+h) Z
0
t
i0
, then inference based on (3) is invalid.14 Clements (2008) provides further
discussion of (4) relative to (3) when we allow for individual heterogeneity15: we will simply report
14Consider the simplest case where the only explanatory variable is
p
Vt (yt+h), and the population regression is
given by:
Et (Yt+h)  ft+h;t = 1
p
Vt (Yt+h) + "t+h
where in fact 1 = 0, so that loss is quadratic. Inference is based on this regression but with the dependent variable
measured with error, et+h;t = yt+h  ft+h;t = Et (Yt+h)  ft+h;t+ t+h, so that the actual regression the investigator
runs is:
et+h;t = 1
p
Vt (yt+h) + t+h
where t+h = "t+h + t+h. Then b1 p! 1 + Cov pVt (yt+h); "t+h + t+h  V ar pVt (yt+h) 1. Therefore,b1 p! Cov pVt (yt+h); t+hV ar pVt (yt+h) 1. If t+h is positively (negatively) correlated with the conditional
standard deviation, then we may conclude that 1 is positive (negative).
15Essentially the use of (4) allows tests of the asymmetry of the loss function without requiring that the forecasts
make full use of all available information. Consider the standard way of testing for asymmetry. This regresses the
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tests based on (4) as the dependent variable in this regression is the quantity of direct interest in
our context.
When we allow heterogeneous information sets and individual-specic h values, hi, then
ft+h;t;i = Et;i (yt+h) + hi
p
Vt;i (yt+h), where the conditional mean and variance are dened as
expectations with respect to the individuals information set 
t;i. In general, this suggests that
1 in (4) may di¤er over individuals, and we test the assumption that the coe¢ cients of the panel
regression are the same over individuals by allowing both random e¤ects and random coe¢ cients.
The results of the panel regressions are given in table 7. We restrict the explanatory variables to
the standard deviation, an intercept, and either the value of output growth or ination known at the
time the forecast was made (taken from the RTDSMs), in order that we can more easily interpret
the estimated coe¢ cients. Separate regressions are run for forecasts made in the four quarters of
the year, as the theory suggests the coe¢ cient on the forecast standard deviation may depend on
the forecast horizon. We begin by reporting results for the random-e¤ects GLS estimator, as the
Hausman specication tests do not reject the assumptions that support the use of this more e¢ cient
estimator relative to the xed-e¤ects estimator. (The Hausman tests are calculated assuming the
random-e¤ects estimator is fully e¢ cient). For ination, we nd that the standard deviation is
positive and (last periods) ination rate is negative for the Q1 survey forecasts, and that these
terms are individually and jointly signicant. At shorter horizons neither term is statistically
signicant. Interpreted in the context of asymmetric (point forecast) loss functions, the positive
e¤ect of the forecast standard deviation would suggest higher costs to over-predicting relative to
under-prediction. For the forecasts of output, actual output is signicant for the Q1 forecasts, and
remains so for the Q2 forecasts. The sign on the standard deviation is now negative, so in terms
of asymmetric loss, has the interpretation that it pays to be optimistic, but is not statistically
signicant from zero. For both the output and ination forecasts the negative coe¢ cient on the
actual value indicates that higher output growth (ination) is systematically related with next
periods point forecast exceeding the histogram mean, at least for the Q1 survey forecasts. In
table 6 we rejected the e¢ ciency of both types of forecast in separate regressions. Our results
forecast error (constructed from the outcomes and point forecasts) on variables known at the time the forecast was
made, and the conditional standard deviation of the forecasts. Suppose that, relative to an individuals information
set, there are a series of negative shocks to output growth over the sample period, so that the individuals point
forecasts tend to be too favourable - this could be taken as evidence that the individual has asymmetric loss such
that over-predictions are less costly than under-predictions. Using (4), the conditional mean would control for the
negative shocks - it would be higher than warranted based on an information set that includes the shocks, but under
the asymmetry hypothesis the deviation between the conditional mean and the point forecast should only depend on
the conditional standard deviation of the forecast. Under quadratic loss this deviation should not di¤er systematically
from zero and should not be related to any variables known at the time the forecasts are made.
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here indicate that the di¤erence between the two varies systematically with lagged output growth
(ination), at least for the Q1 survey forecasts.
The random-coe¢ cients estimator treats the parameter vector as a di¤erent realization of a
stochastic process for each individual respondent. This may be warranted to the extent that the
degree of asymmetry of the loss function is not the same over individuals. The coe¢ cient estimates
reported in table 7 are the means of the distributions. In addition, we report a test of parameter
constancy, which for both variables and all four horizons rejects the assumption that the coe¢ cients
are the same across the individuals. Even so, the picture that emerges is similar to that assuming
random e¤ects - we reject the joint null of insignicance of both the explanatory variables (other
than the constant) for the Q1 forecasts, and the signs of the average coe¢ cients agree with the
random-e¤ects estimates.
Finally, although the panel regressions pair the two types of forecast by individual, we also wish
to check whether the results are qualitatively unchanged if we change the assumptions behind the
calculation of the histogram means. We could make a di¤erent assumption about the distributions
that underlie the reported histograms, or we could simply use the non-parametric bounds approach.
We choose to do the latter, and dene a binary dependent variable which is unity when the forecasts
are more optimistic than the bounds (i.e., exceed the upper bound, fall below the lower bound, for
output and ination, respectively).16 The cost of using the bounds approach is a loss of information
because large mean-point forecast discrepancies are treated on a par with those which are only just
inconsistent with the bounds. Against this, we can be condent that the observed discrepancies
are a characteristic of the point forecasts and underlying subjective distributions and not just our
chosen method of calculating moments from histograms.
The nal set of results in table 7 are for the random-e¤ects panel-logit estimator. The results
conrm the nding that the forecast standard deviation and the actual value in the previous period
are signicant for the Q1 forecasts for both variables. In addition we nd that both variables remain
signicant for the Q2 output growth forecasts, and that the forecast standard deviation matters
for ination for all quarters. The signs on the standard deviations are consistent with the signs we
found earlier given the denitions of the dependent variables.
We also report a specication test of whether the panel (individual) dimension is statistically
signicant, that is, whether the individual-level variance component matters. For output, we reject
the likelihood ratio test that the panel and pooled-OLS estimators are equivalent, but for ination
we nd the opposite (except for the Q2 forecasts).
16 It may seem natural to allow three categories - optimistic, pessimisticand consistent with the bounds, but
have not done this because there are few pessimistic forecasts.
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In summary, the di¤erent models and panel estimators all indicate a role for the forecast stan-
dard deviation and last periods actual value in explaining the discrepancy (or the inconsistency,
in the case of the panel-logit regressions) between the mean and point forecasts, especially at the
longest horizon forecasts, which are those made in the rst quarter of the year. In terms of the
discussion of asymmetric loss, the relevance of the forecast standard deviation would point towards
asymmetry, whilst the signicance of the lagged actual value is inconsistent with rational behav-
iour by the forecaster for the class of loss functions we have allowed. The lagged values of output
growth and ination should not be systematically related to the di¤erence between the respondents
histogram mean and point forecast. The signicance of the forecast standard deviation in these
regressions is consistent with the explanations of distribution shape and computational complexity
of sections 4 and 5, but it is only in conjunction with the hypothesis of asymmetric loss that this
factor explains the direction of the inconsistencies (i.e., the tendency to over-optimism of the point
forecasts). In the next section we consider forecast accuracy, which as we will show is not supportive
of the asymmetric loss hypothesis.
8 Accuracy of point forecasts and histogram means
Hitherto we have not considered which of the two types of forecast are the more accurate. This is
primarily because forecast accuracy is distinct from consistency, but it is natural to ask whether
the optimismof the point forecasts is well founded. One of the problems with measuring forecast
accuracy is that it is unclear what should be used as outturns to calculate forecast errors. Re-
spondents may be seeking to forecast the rst announcements of the data, or the second, or some
subsequent revision. A number of authors have chosen to use the second data release (e.g., Romer
and Romer (2000) and Patton and Timmermann (2007)) and we report results for this choice of
outturns. One might justify the use of a relatively early vintage if revisions are newsin the sense
of being unpredictable at the time the initial estimates was released, 17 as well as when there
are benchmark revisions, such that the latest estimates are compiled using di¤erent accounting
procedures or methodological practices.
Table 8 reports the accuracy (measured by mean squared forecast error - MSFE) of the point
forecasts and histogram means for a number of sub-periods, and also compares the relative accuracy
of the two sets of forecasts when they are inconsistent (in the sense that the point forecasts lie
outside the non-parametric bounds on the histogram means). If we consider all the forecasts for
both variables, then the point forecasts are markedly more accurate than the histogram means
17Mankiw and Shapiro (1986) found that revisions to real output added news - see Croushore (2006) for a full
discussion of data vintage revisions.
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calculated in the conventional way (assuming all the probability mass is located at the midpoints
of the bins) or via a normal approximation (following Giordani and Söderlind (2003)), for all the
sub-periods. Although the di¤erences in MSFE are often large (for output growth, for example,
the MSFE of the point forecasts is only 53% of that of the histogram means for the period 1981:3
to 1991:4, and only 72% for the period 1992:1 to 2006:4), we are assuming that the methods we
use to calculate the histogram means accurately reect the respondentsmeans. To counter the
possibility that our nding in favour of the point forecasts in terms of accuracy is an artifact of the
way the histogram means are calculated, we next focus on those pairs of forecasts when the means
and point forecasts are inconsistent, either because the point forecast exceeds the upper bound,
or falls below the lower bound. For these two sets of forecasts, we undertake a comparison where
the histogram mean is calculated so as to minimize the squared forecast error, subject to it lying
within the bounds.18 The MSFEs of this most-favourable scenario for the histogram means are
given in the nal column of the table. For ination, the point forecasts are more accurate than the
histogram mean when they are more optimistic (rows headed by point < bound) for the second
and third subperiods, but not for the rst. For output growth, the optimistic(point > bound)
point forecasts are more accurate for the rst subperiod and just about the same in the second
period.
This would suggest that the point forecasts are more accurate indicators of rst moments than
the histograms. Engelberg et al. (2007) view the discrepancies between the point forecasts and
histograms as suggesting that point predictions may have a systematic, favourable bias, and infer
from this that measures of central tendency should be calculated from probabilistic expectations.
The evidence presented here indicates instead that rst moments derived from survey respondents
histograms have a tendency toward pessimism, and that directly reported point forecasts are more
accurate.
These ndings also bear on the credibility of the asymmetric loss explanation of the observed
inconsistencies. This is because the expected squared error of a point forecast must be at least
as large as the expected squared error of the conditional mean; the conditional mean minimizes
the expected squared error amongst all possible forecasts. The expected squared error of the point
forecast will equal that of the conditional mean when loss is quadratic, when the optimal point
forecast is the conditional mean, but for asymmetric loss the squared-error loss of the optimal
point forecast should exceed that of the conditional mean. Our nding that point forecasts are
more accurate under quadratic loss (MSFE) counts against the asymmetric loss argument.
18Thus the histogram mean equals the actual when the actual lies within the bounds, giving a zero error; equals
the upper bound when the actual lies above the upper bound; and equals the lower bound when the actual lies below
the lower bound.
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Clements (2008) also reports comparisons of the relative accuracy of the two types of forecasts
for output growth, and obtains less clear-cut results. However, his comparison is of the relative
accuracy of the set of point forecasts which are consistent with the bounds against the set of point
forecasts which lie outside the bounds. This will not necessarily be informative about the two types
of forecasts (histograms versus point) if the composition of the two sets of point forecasts depends
on factors which are related to predictability: for example, if it were the case that point forecasts
and bounds are less likely to be consistent during periods of change when output growth is less
predictable.
9 Conclusions
We have sought explanations for the nding that respondents to the Survey of Professional Fore-
casters habitually report point forecasts of annual output growth and ination which are more
optimistic than the mean forecasts of their forecast histograms for these two variables. This occurs
most frequently for the forecasts made in the rst quarter - approximately 20% of rst-quarter
output growth and ination forecasts lie above and below, respectively, the bounds on the corre-
sponding histogram means. We show that this nding is not driven by an incorrect assumption
that respondentsreported point forecasts correspond to their means - approximately 85% of the
point forecasts of ination made in the rst quarter surveys are not compatible with the histograms
whether we interpret them as either the mean or the mode or the median of the underlying subjec-
tive probability distributions. Moreover, we nd that these inconsistencies are not attributable to
a small number of errant respondents, and that they can not be accounted for by a small number
of surveys.
We nd that the degree of forecast uncertainty, as measured by the dispersion of the histogram,
is systematically related to the tendency for the point forecasts to present a rosier outlook than the
histograms. We have considered a number of possible reasons for this correlation. These include the
shape of the underlying distribution function, and whether it is due to computational complexity.
These two explanations are hard to distinguish, as a more dispersed underlying distribution will
be correlated with non-zero probabilities being assigned to a greater number of histogram bins,
and the use of a greater number of bins may decrease the likelihood of the respondent calculating
mutually consistent point forecasts and histogram means. Comparing across histograms before
and after a change in the bin widths (allowing greater dispersion for a given level of computational
complexity) provides some tentative evidence that computational complexity, rather than the shape
of the underlying probability distributions, is the relevant factor, although the evidence is somewhat
mixed.
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However, the recent literature on testing for rationality allowing for asymmetric loss also sug-
gests that forecast uncertainty will a¤ect the relationship between the conditional mean and the
point forecasts. If the histograms accurately reect the individualstrue (subjective) beliefs, then
individuals will report point forecasts that under or over-predict relative to their mean forecast
if they have asymmetric loss functions, and the extent to which they do so will depend on their
perceived forecast uncertainty. Our results are generally not supportive of the asymmetric loss
explanation, for two reasons. Firstly, although we nd a role for the forecast standard deviation
in our panel regressions, we also nd that last periods actual value helps predict the di¤erence
between the mean and point forecast. The signicance of the lagged actual value is inconsistent
with rational behaviour by the forecaster for the class of loss functions we have allowed. Secondly,
we nd that point forecasts are more accurate (assuming a squared-error loss function) than the
histogram means. If the respondents have asymmetric loss functions, then the expected squared er-
ror of a point forecast must exceed the expected squared error of the conditional mean. Our relative
forecast accuracy ndings count against the asymmetric loss explanation. The discrepancies be-
tween the point forecasts and histograms have been viewed as evidence that point predictions may
have a systematic, favourable bias(Engelberg et al. (2007)), but this appears to be unwarranted.
Rather, our ndings indicate that rst moments derived from survey respondents histograms have
a tendency toward pessimism relative to the outcomes. The relative accuracy of the point forecasts
judged by squared-error loss would also tend to lend support to our maintained assumption that
the point forecasts are estimates of the mean.
As an alternative explanation for the inconsistency of the point forecasts and histograms, we
consider the possibility forecasters react di¤erently to the arrival of new information when they
come to update point and histogram forecasts, as might be the case if the costs of information
acquisition and processing di¤er for the two types of forecasts. There is some evidence that the
longer-horizon histogram mean forecasts are not updated to incorporate the latest information at
same rate as the point forecasts.
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Table 1: Bounds violations: mean, mode, median and conservative
Q # mean median mode conservative
within below above within below above within below above within below above
Output growth
1 547 75.50 4.57 19.93 71.48 5.85 22.67 81.35 6.03 12.61 89.03 2.56 7.86
2 586 80.72 3.75 15.53 76.11 3.75 20.14 84.98 4.10 10.92 91.13 2.39 6.48
3 523 81.84 4.21 13.96 81.07 4.02 14.91 86.04 4.59 9.37 91.59 2.10 6.12
4 424 87.74 3.77 8.49 81.84 5.42 12.74 84.91 5.19 9.91 91.75 3.07 5.19
Ination
1 1046 71.89 21.51 6.60 69.12 17.59 13.29 75.14 15.01 9.85 83.84 11.28 4.59
2 1075 75.07 19.72 5.21 73.21 14.33 12.47 78.70 12.74 8.56 86.60 9.30 4.09
3 894 76.29 13.65 10.07 69.80 11.08 19.13 75.17 10.96 13.87 84.12 7.72 8.17
4 541 84.10 11.65 4.25 78.19 10.17 11.65 82.81 10.35 6.84 89.65 6.84 3.51
Output growth. The gures are based on surveys from 1981:3 to 2006:4, and are similar to those reported
by Clements (2008) on a shorter sample. The Q1 surveys of 1985 and 1986 are excluded as the Philadelphia
Fed has documented possible problems with the forecast distributions in these surveys.
The point forecasts of the growth rate are calculated using the actual data for the previous year from the
RTDSM available in the quarter of the survey. The one exception is that the RTDSM for 1996Q1 is missing
the value for 1995Q4. In constructing the year-on-year point forecast growth rates for the respondents to
the 1996Q1 survey we use the previous-quarter forecasts (of 1995Q4).
Ination. Based on surveys 68:4 to 06:4. There are missing observations for the histograms for a number of
surveys, because respondents were mistakenly asked about the wrong year in those surveys. See the online
documentation provided by the Philadelphia Feb: Documentation for the Philadelphia Feds Survey of
Professional Forecasters, http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/spf/. The problematic survey quarters are 1985.1,
1986.1, 1968.4, 1969.4, 1970.4, 1971.4, 1972.3, 1972.4, 1973.4, 1975.4, 1976.4, 1977.4, 1978.4, 1979.2, 1979.3,
1979.4. That these are predominantly Q4 surveys accounts for the smaller number of respondents to Q4
surveys in the table.
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Figure 1: Ination. The number of respondents with percentages of their point forecasts below
(top panel) and above (bottom panel) their bounds, where the bars are less than 5%, 5 to 10% etc.
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Figure 2: Output Growth. The number of respondents with percentages of their point forecasts
below (top panel) and above (bottom panel) their bounds, where the bars are less than 5%, 5 to
10% etc.
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Figure 3: Output growth. For each survey quarter, the two bars report the percentage of individuals
whose point forecasts were below their mean bounds (b), and the percentage above the bounds
(a). The top left panel is for forecasts made in the rst quarter, the top right for second quarter
forecasts etc.
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Figure 4: Ination. For each survey quarter, the two bars report the percentage of individuals
whose point forecasts were below their mean bounds (b), and the percentage above the bounds
(a). The top left panel is for forecasts made in the rst quarter, the top right for second quarter
forecasts etc.
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Table 2: Bounds violations and measures of uncertainty
% point forecasts point forecasts: point forecasts:
Survey within below above within below above within below above
quarter forecasts mean bounds median variance median IQ
Output growth
Q1 547 75.50 4.57 19.93 0.66 0.76 1.02 1.18 1.20 1.40
Q2 586 80.72 3.75 15.53 0.54 0.67 0.78 1.12 1.18 1.27
Q3 523 81.84 4.21 13.96 0.34 0.88 0.77 0.99 1.42 1.30
Q4 424 87.74 3.77 8.49 0.17 0.44 0.40 0.89 1.27 1.05
Ination
Q1 1046 71.89 21.51 6.60 0.43 0.78 0.43 1.07 1.25 1.07
Q2 1075 75.07 19.72 5.21 0.38 0.69 0.54 1.06 1.20 1.12
Q3 894 76.29 13.65 10.07 0.33 0.58 0.33 1.01 1.18 1.00
Q4 541 84.10 11.65 4.25 0.18 0.38 0.43 0.96 1.06 1.06
See notes to Table 1.
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Table 3: Violations of bounds and the number of non-zero histogram bins
No. bins No. forecasts % within % below % above Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Ination, 68:4 to 81:2
2 199 76.88 9.55 13.57 46 74 62 17
3 537 70.20 14.15 15.64 180 181 149 27
4 311 63.67 23.79 12.54 128 105 65 13
5 160 66.25 23.75 10.00 61 63 31 5
6 64 54.69 35.94 9.38 32 15 17 0
7 47 51.06 42.55 6.38 23 14 8 2
8 30 40.00 43.33 16.67 16 9 5 0
9 23 34.78 43.48 21.74 11 11 1 0
10 10 50.00 30.00 20.00 7 1 1 1
11 4 100.00 0.00 0.00 2 1 1 0
12 3 33.33 33.33 33.33 2 0 1 0
13 . . . . . . . .
14 3 33.33 66.67 0.00 1 2 0 0
15 7 28.57 28.57 42.86 2 3 2 0
Ination, 81:3 to 91:4
2 282 88.30 9.22 2.48 40 69 74 99
3 273 86.08 10.99 2.93 52 87 84 50
4 92 78.26 18.48 3.26 31 29 19 13
5 38 78.95 18.42 2.63 13 11 10 4
6 38 52.63 47.37 0.00 15 12 7 4
Ination, 92:1 to 2006:4
2 367 88.28 10.35 1.36 53 73 95 146
3 496 86.09 11.69 2.22 135 129 138 94
4 270 81.48 16.30 2.22 88 80 59 43
5 139 74.10 23.74 2.16 49 46 33 11
6 70 65.71 34.29 0.00 23 31 11 5
7 44 47.73 52.27 0.00 22 10 10 2
8 14 35.71 42.86 21.43 2 9 3 0
9 15 53.33 46.67 0.00 5 6 2 2
10 20 50.00 50.00 0.00 7 4 6 3
Output Growth, 81:3 to 91:4
2 200 89.00 4.00 7.00 26 57 64 53
3 202 86.14 5.94 7.92 55 64 45 38
4 78 91.03 2.56 6.41 26 30 15 7
5 36 88.89 2.78 8.33 12 9 8 7
6 36 63.89 22.22 13.89 15 9 7 5
Output Growth, 92:1 to 06:4
2 312 89.10 3.85 7.05 28 54 84 146
3 455 88.35 2.42 9.23 105 117 138 95
4 282 77.66 3.19 19.15 91 84 66 41
5 211 72.99 4.27 22.75 79 73 41 18
6 92 58.70 4.35 36.96 41 28 18 5
7 71 63.38 8.45 28.17 31 22 14 4
8 37 72.97 0.00 27.03 14 16 7 0
9 19 47.37 10.53 42.11 8 7 3 1
10 49 40.82 2.04 57.14 16 16 13 4
Output Growth Between 1981:3 and 1991:4 respondents attached probabilities to up to 6 bins,
each with width of 2% points. From 1992:1 onwards there were 10 bins with widths of 1% point.
Ination Between 68:4 and 81:2 there were 15 bins with width of 1 %, between 81:4 and 91:4, 6
bins with width of 2, and from 92:1 onwards 10 bins with a width of 1.
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Table 4: Median variance estimates for bounds violations conditional on the number of bins
point forecast
within below above
No. bins median variance
Ination
68:4 to 81:2
2 0.14 0.17 0.17
3 0.29 0.31 0.29
4 0.57 0.58 0.58
81:3 to 91:4
2 0.45 0.54 0.54
3 0.86 1.30 0.61
4 2.05 2.29 2.30
92:1 to 2006:4
2 0.14 0.17 0.02
3 0.22 0.29 0.22
4 0.46 0.57 0.58
Output Growth
81:3 to 91:4
2 0.45 0.60 0.54
3 0.86 1.05 1.40
4 1.86 1.30 2.30
92:4 to 06:4
2 0.12 0.17 0.14
3 0.22 0.29 0.29
4 0.46 0.42 0.58
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Table 5: Point forecasts, histogram means and news
Dep. variable Point forecasts Histogram means
Fixed e¤ects Random e¤ects Fixed e¤ects Random e¤ects
Coe¤. s.e. Coe¤. s.e. Coe¤. s.e. Coe¤. s.e.
Output growth
Q4 1 0.067 0.024 0.069 0.022 0.024 0.083 0.043 0.075
2 0.934 0.024 0.934 0.022 1.002 0.072 0.994 0.072
Q3 1 0.069 0.022 0.094 0.027 0.083 0.070 0.145 0.073
2 0.956 0.032 0.934 0.036 0.922 0.052 0.868 0.058
Q2 1 0.138 0.049 0.167 0.052 0.299 0.056 0.358 0.045
2 0.852 0.037 0.831 0.039 0.744 0.073 0.697 0.067
Ination
Q4 1 0.046 0.034 0.062 0.036 0.146 0.127 0.184 0.132
2 0.964 0.037 0.943 0.038 0.840 0.130 0.791 0.133
Q3 1 0.077 0.031 0.094 0.031 0.115 0.095 0.131 0.105
2 0.917 0.026 0.901 0.027 0.951 0.122 0.897 0.120
Q2 1 0.127 0.047 0.152 0.044 0.158 0.045 0.211 0.054
2 0.863 0.045 0.835 0.043 0.802 0.064 0.749 0.071
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Table 6: Point forecasts, histogram means and past information
Dep. variable Point forecasts Histogram means
Fixed e¤ects Random e¤ects Fixed e¤ects Random e¤ects
Output growth
Q4 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Q3 0.011 0.002 0.168 0.181
Q2 0.229 0.151 0.002 0.001
Ination
Q4 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000
Q3 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.099
Q2 0.025 0.000 0.039 0.001
The entries in the table are the p-values of tests that the four macro-variables are jointly insigni-
cant.
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Table 7: Panel regressions explaining the discrepancy between the histogram mean and point
forecasts, and the probability of the point forecast being more optimisticthan the bound on the
histogram mean (random-e¤ects logistic)
Random-e¤ects GLS Random-coe¢ cients Random-e¤ects logistic
Coe¤. Std. Err z Coe¤. Std. Err z Coe¤. Std. Err z
Ination
Q1  .449 .119 3.77 .302 .192 1.58 1.73 .377 4.61
Inf -.048 .009 -5.48 -.059 .027 -2.15 -.277 .118 -2.33
Con -.007 .064 -0.10 .0811 .126 0.64 -2.48 .379 -6.55
Wald p-value Cconstancy; Wald p-value Panel vs pooled; Wald p-value
0.000 0.006; 0.045 0.272; 0.000
Q2  .113 .109 1.04 .131 .200 0.66 1.49 .450 3.32
Inf -.015 .025 -0.60 -.041 .042 -0.98 -.123 .126 -0.98
Con .137 .077 1.77 .154 .137 1.12 -2.50 .497 -5.03
Wald p-value Constancy; Wald p-value Panel vs pooled; Wald p-value
0.571 0.000; 0.609 0.007; 0.004
Q3  .255 .148 1.73 .099 .185 0.54 2.79 .615 4.53
Inf -.005 .030 -0.16 .005 .038 0.15 -.354 .163 -2.17
Con -.015 .089 -0.16 .003 .139 0.02 -2.89 .564 -5.12
Wald p-value Constancy; Wald p-value Panel vs pooled; Wald p-value
0.142 0.000; 0.841 0.241; 0.000
Q4  .109 .067 1.62 .052 .384 0.14 1.29 .546 2.36
Inf -.032 .022 -1.49 -.060 .056 -1.07 -.288 .196 -1.47
Con .092 .061 1.52 .151 .216 0.70 -2.24 .456 -4.90
Wald p-value Constancy; Wald p-value Panel vs pooled; Wald p-value
0.117 0.000; 0.543 1.00; 0.046
Output growth
Q1  -.169 .122 -1.38 -.202 .184 -1.10 1.85 .544 3.40
Out -.067 .017 -4.02 -.058 .018 -3.16 .330 .091 3.61
Con .186 .115 1.62 .208 .153 1.36 -4.70 .786 -5.99
Wald p-value Constancy; Wald p-value Panel vs pooled; Wald p-value
0.000 0.000; 0.007 0.000; 0.000
Q2  -.133 .103 -1.29 -.166 .188 -0.88 1.28 .586 2.18
Out -.047 .019 -2.41 -.044 .016 -2.81 .394 .110 3.57
Con .075 .120 0.63 .142 .138 1.03 -4.81 .818 -5.88
Wald p-value Constancy; Wald p-value Panel vs pooled; Wald p-value
0.029 0.000; 0.017 0.000; 0.000
Q3  -.035 .073 -0.47 .156 .200 0.78 1.14 .646 1.76
Out -.057 .039 -1.44 -.037 .034 -1.09 .350 .118 2.98
Con .047 .124 0.38 -.098 .1149 -0.85 -3.97 .643 -6.18
Wald p-value Constancy; Wald p-value Panel vs pooled; Wald p-value
0.347 0.000; 0.514 0.083; 0.004
Q4  -.121 .092 -1.31 .372 .215 1.73 -.163 1.028 -0.16
Out .016 .028 0.58 .014 .029 0.50 .073 .170 0.43
Con -.072 .142 -0.51 -.276 .157 -1.76 -3.46 .935 -3.70
Wald p-value Constancy; Wald p-value Panel vs pooled; Wald p-value
0.105 0.000; 0.222 0.022; 0.902
The columns headed zare the t-statistics, where z denotes that the small-sample distributions are un-
known. The Wald p-values are for the tests of the joint insignicance of the regressors other than the
constant (Con); where  is the standard deviation of histogram; and Inf and Out are the actual quarterly
ination rates and output growth (at an annual rate) in the previous quarter. Constancyis the p-value of
a test that parameter vector is the same over all individuals. Panel vs pooledis the p-value of a likelihood
ratio test that the panel-dimension is unimportant in the panel-logit regression, in the sense that the pooled
estimator and panel estimator are equivalent.
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Table 8: Accuracy of point forecasts and histogram means
No. of Point Histogram Histogram mean Histogram mean
forecasts forecast mean Normal approx. bounds
Ination
68:4 to 81:2
All 1410 1.37 1.61 1.66
point > bound 192 1.99 3.32 3.48 2.28
point < bound 285 1.72 2.08 2.07 1.30
81:3 to 91:4
All 786 0.39 0.87 0.76
point > bound 21 1.46 1.07 1.46 0.13
point < bound 100 0.95 3.53 3.01 1.18
92:1 to 06:4
All 1507 0.12 0.27 0.25
point > bound 28 0.11 0.42 0.50 0.07
point < bound 243 0.16 0.89 0.76 0.38
Output growth
81:3 to 91:4
All 607 0.58 1.08 1.08
point > bound 43 0.69 4.27 4.12 1.82
point > bound 33 0.56 3.12 3.01 0.99
92:1 to 06:4
All 1606 0.39 0.55 0.54
point > bound 267 0.61 1.31 1.20 0.60
point < bound 54 0.40 0.52 0.61 0.18
The actual values used to calculate the forecast errors are the second-release real-time data.
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